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Abstract 
The explanation of offending and reoffending currently relies upon the Risk-Need-
Responsivity model’s concept of “criminogenic need” (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Bonta 
& Andrews, 2017) or dynamic risk factors (DRF). This is problematic because the DRF 
construct is predictive rather than explanatory, and suffers from a number of 
conceptual problems. Relatedly, the identification and management of DRF in 
individuals who have committed crimes is an overriding concern for the criminal 
justice system. It drives the formation of correctional policy and the funding of 
treatment programs in prisons, forensic hospitals, and probation services. Significant 
theoretical work is required in order to transform DRF into explanatory tools which 
are useful for research and practice. In this paper we outline problems with DRF which 
obstruct this process and then sketch out a possible way forward, the Risk-Causality 
Method, with its three phases of deconstruction, analysis, and reintegration.  
 
 
Keywords: explanation of crime, dynamic risk factors, risk factors 
 
 
  
	 3	
Introduction 
The identification and management of dynamic risk factors (DRF) in 
individuals who have committed crimes is an overriding concern for the criminal 
justice system. It drives the formation of correctional policy and the funding of 
treatment programs in prisons, forensic hospitals, and probation services.  Structured 
risk assessment has demonstrated marked success in predicting recidivism and 
provides a principled basis for allocating individuals to intervention streams (Andrews 
& Bonta, 2010; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009; Olver, Stockdale, Wormith, 2014). 
DRF appear to add incremental value in predictive algorithms and are increasingly 
being imported into research and treatment domains as explanatory constructs 
(Cording, Beggs-Christoferson, & Grace, 2016). In their recent book Bonta and 
Andrews (2017) state that “dynamic predictors of criminal conduct or criminogenic 
need factors have great practical relevance because they inform interventions that 
reduce criminal behavior by identifying the targets of treatment” (p.20, italics in the 
original). This view strongly suggests that DRF play a causal role in reoffending, and 
therefore ought to be a focus of explanations of crime and taken into account when 
designing intervention programs. 
The application of risk-related data to form explanations of individual behavior 
requires robust theoretical knowledge, whether explaining group level phenomena or 
individual offending in the form of forensic case formulations (Hart, Sturmey, Logan 
& McMurran, 2011; Lewis & Doyle, 2009; Logan & Johnstone, 2013). Appealing to 
causes goes well beyond observing correlations between events, and frequently will 
refer to etiological (i.e., instigating causes) and compositional (i.e., processes that 
constitute or underlie the phenomena) mechanisms. These mechanisms are 
responsible for producing the affective, cognitive, biological, behavioral, and social 
phenomena associated with serious normative violations (i.e., crime), and by doing so, 
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they are crucial in guiding treatment. Thus the identification of relevant mechanisms 
is an explanatory not a predictive task (Ward & Fortune, 2016a). 
A pressing concern is whether or not DRF can actually do the jobs prescribed 
for them by researchers and practitioners (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Bonta & Andrews, 
2017; Mann, Hanson, & Thornton, 2010; Hart & Logan, 2011). It has been suggested 
recently that DRF in their current form are best thought of as (at least partially) 
symptom-like features of individuals and their environments which are generated by 
causal mechanisms rather than being causes themselves - they are a good starting 
point to think about the causes of offending (Ward & Fortune, 2016a, 2016b; Ward & 
Beech, 2015). A difficulty with recent work on incorporating DRF into explanations of 
(re)offending, risk assessment, and/or forensic case formulations is that it is assumed 
that they are coherent constructs (e.g., Hart, Sturmey, Logan & McMurran, 2011; 
Sturmey & McMurran, 2011). In our view this is not the case, and DRF are better 
conceptualized as red flags (i.e., symptom-like features) that indicate the existence of 
problems but cannot explain why they have arisen or persisted. They may be useful 
predictors but are not coherent explanatory constructs. The current emphasis on 
empirically established lists of DRF or criminogenic needs embedded within a theory 
of criminal conduct (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Bonta & Andrews, 2017) in both research 
and practice falls short of causal explanation (see Ward & Fortune, 2016a). 
The major goal of this paper is to explore ways in which DRF can be used to 
explain offending behavior and to guide assessment and treatment. We offer one 
possible method for utilizing DRF within explanations in both research and clinical 
work: the Risk-Causality Method (RCM). We first argue for the value of adopting a 
methodological framework within which to conduct research. Second, the problems 
with the current conceptualization of DRF are noted, drawing from an example of the 
general dynamic risk category of intimacy deficits. Third, we follow this with a 
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discussion of possible solutions from the recent theoretical literature, and comment 
on their potential and limitations in addressing the problems currently faced by DRF. 
Fourth, we present the RCM in detail and apply it to the example of emotional 
congruence with children. Fifth, practice implications of the RCM are briefly 
discussed. Finally, we conclude with some remarks concerning its potential 
contribution to the field.  
It is hoped that the arguments and suggestions developed here will encourage 
future research into the composition of DRF and their role in informing more useful 
explanations of offending and related phenomena. What we are offering in this paper 
is a methodological framework to help researchers and practitioners infer the possible 
causes of crime and its related problems.  The use of the RCM can make the task of 
translating DRF into specific causal processes easier, and therefore bridge the current 
theoretical gap between prediction and explanation in both research and practice 
domains.  
 
Methodological Frameworks in Research 
Scientists employ specific methods to detect empirical phenomena, and 
construct models or theories of the causal mechanisms thought to be responsible for 
their occurrence. A general methodological framework offers a way of unifying the 
diverse range of cognitive tasks involved in reaching these descriptive and explanatory 
goals. Following Haig (2014), science typically proceeds as follows: constrained by a 
developing problem comprising a set of empirical, conceptual, and methodological 
considerations, certain data are brought to the researcher’s attention and are ordered 
via the detection of one or more phenomena. Once detected, these phenomena are 
explained by abductively inferring the existence of an underlying causal mechanism. 
Here, abductive inference involves reasoning from a presumed effect (i.e., the 
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phenomenon) to its explanation in terms of an underlying causal mechanism (i.e., the 
theory). From an initial judgement of the plausibility of such an explanatory theory, 
attempts are made to elaborate on the nature of that mechanism, frequently by way of 
constructing plausible models. When the theory is well developed, it is evaluated on a 
number of dimensions including its empirical adequacy and criteria principally to do 
with the explanatory worth of the theory. 
 The value of adopting a theory of scientific method is that it unifies the diverse 
tasks that constitute research within an overarching general framework: formulating 
an initial question, designing a study, choosing methods for collecting data, analyzing 
data, detecting explanatory targets, inferring etiological and compositional factors 
(i.e., the structures and processes constituting mechanisms that underlie phenomena), 
and so on. Without a methodological framework it is easy to get lost in the research 
process and run the risk of squandering limited cognitive, social, and financial 
resources. Consistent with this view, it makes sense to construct general methods of 
inquiry to guide researchers in their attempts to identity and explain crime and its 
related phenomena. If we accept that DRF track causal processes in some way (see 
below), then coming up with a general method to help isolate and model potential 
causes at multiple levels of analysis will be invaluable. This kind of methodological 
framework will be nested within the type of general scientific method discussed above; 
it should provide assistance in picking out promising causal factors from the research 
and clinical literature, and in constructing rich descriptive models of their constituents 
and subsequent causal impact. The Risk Causality Model (RCM) is an example of such 
a methodological framework. 
 
Dynamic Risk Factors 
	 7	
Dynamic risk factors (DRF) are changeable features of individuals and their 
environments which predict higher rates of reoffending. They are also referred to as 
“criminogenic needs” and there appears to be consensus that they are at least potential 
causes of criminal behavior (Bonta & Andrews, 2017; Mann et al., 2010). DRF are 
contrasted with static risk factors, which are risk correlates such as criminal history, 
age, and gender unable to be changed via intervention. Because of these defining 
features, DRF are used as both predictors of risk and targets for change. This is 
reflected in the evolution of assessment tools from containing primarily static markers 
of risk to incorporating dynamic variables which can be used to guide practice. The 
recruitment of DRF to explain crime, formulate cases, and inform treatment is now 
standard practice. Researchers propose that the most strongly supported variables 
should be emphasized in both assessment and treatment of those who have committed 
offences (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Bonta & Andrews, 2017). For example, in the case 
of individuals who have committed sexual offences, emotion regulation problems, 
deviant sexual interests, offence supportive attitudes and beliefs, and social intimacy 
deficits have all been identified as DRF in the literature (Mann et al., 2010). 
While it is assumed that DRF have an explanatory role in research and practice, 
there are a number of conceptual problems with these predictive constructs which we 
will briefly outline here. (1) The first problem is that DRF lack coherence, they are 
composite constructs which contain a number of different types of variable (Ward & 
Fortune, 2016a). While they contain causal strands, in their standard form they are 
more like general categories that also incorporate contextual (e.g., gang membership), 
behavioral (e.g., watching child pornography), and psychological state aspects (e.g., 
feeling lonely). (2) Due to the co-existence of these composite categories and their 
multiple potential causal strands, DRF lack specificity. That is to say they are unable 
to identify which potential cause is relevant for explaining certain phenomena. (3) 
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DRF lack precision and suffer from the grain problem, which means that there is little 
agreement concerning which level of abstraction is the appropriate one to interpret 
them at. They are often formulated at various levels: as general or umbrella categories 
or as more fine grained categories composed of specific features. (4) DRF lack 
factualness because they are not scientific kinds. They are normative constructs which 
only exist due to their co-occurrence with behaviors and outcomes which society has 
deemed harmful and/or unlawful. 
In order to make these conceptual problems more concrete, we will apply them 
to the example of lack of emotionally intimate relationships with adults or intimacy 
deficits. This DRF category has strong empirical support for its association with sexual 
recidivism, and relies upon contextual evidence such as having no stable partner 
relationship currently or in the past, or having intimate relationships characterized by 
conflict and infidelity (Mann et al., 2010). It encompasses those who desire and those 
who avoid intimacy, and it has been acknowledged that “these varying facets of 
dysfunctional intimacy may have different underlying pathologies and so may lead to 
different treatment targets” (Mann et al., 2010, p. 201). It is further suggested that 
intimacy deficits could be an indicator of other DRF, such as sexual deviance, 
attachment problems, and poor emotion-management (Mann et al., 2010). Thus it is 
unclear what exactly the term “intimacy deficits” refers to, and how it might increase 
risk at the individual level (i.e., it lacks specificity- problem 2, see above). In addition, 
it is a normative category (problem 4, see above) in the sense that intimacy levels vary 
across the population, and are only deemed to be at a dysfunctional level when they 
co-occur with more serious norm violations such as sexual offending.  
In order to illustrate the remaining two problems, lack of coherence (problem 
1, see above) and lack of precision (problem 3, see above) we will explore the 
composite nature of the category of “intimacy deficits”. The cluster of factors which 
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hang together across explanatory levels and grains of analysis (i.e., from general 
categories to specific processes) to cause or constitute this DRF include (but are not 
limited to):  
• Cultural/contextual level: Norms specifying the types of relationships 
appropriate and what these should involve; gender norms; ideal sources and 
amount of intimacy (e.g., intimacy deficits); laws (e.g., age of consent), and 
social opportunities for connection.  
• Interpersonal/social level: Interpersonal skills (e.g., communication); social 
learning; support/advice, social roles; expectations, and responsibilities.  
• Phenomenological/psychological level: emotional connection/congruence; 
empathy; sexual preferences; beliefs about relationships (i.e., self and others); 
perspective-taking; emotion-management; and attachment style. 
• Neuropsychological level: brain regions and neurotransmitters, such as 
oxytocin, vasopressin, pre-frontal cortex, and hormones that underpin 
psychological problems and experiences indicative of intimacy problems. 
• Biological level: biological sex; sexual arousal; physical health; and physical 
attributes (i.e., size, attractiveness). 
 
Each level of description relies upon various sources of evidence, and varies in 
its level of abstraction. The umbrella category “intimacy deficits” encompasses more 
specific features at lower levels, such as emotional (e.g., congruence with children) and 
cognitive (e.g., beliefs about children and sex) processes. No level on its own can 
provide an adequate explanation of intimacy deficits, as unique properties emerge 
across levels. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but hopefully illustrate the 
range of influences evident in just one DRF category, and also the significance of 
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overlap between different categories (e.g., intimacy, cognition, emotion, and sexual). 
In addition, the inclusion of different types of constructs within a single DRF category 
is incoherent and creates confusion. This discussion provides support for our assertion 
that DRF categories are of little use for the purposes of explanation. They are 
acceptable predictors, but if they are to explain (re)offending or be imported into the 
treatment domain (via case formulation) they need to be reworked (see Ward & 
Fortune, 2016a for an in depth discussion of the problems of coherence, specificity, 
precision/grain, and normativity).  
In order to outline the scope of DRF categories, we provide a summary of the 
core DRF domains for sexual offending against children, and the more specific factors 
within each category. The DRF contained within Table 1 below are taken from Mann 
et al.’s (2010) list of the most well supported and promising psychologically 
meaningful risk factors, meaning that they reliably correlate with reoffending and are 
plausible causal. In addition to providing useful starting points for inquiry, Table 1 
further illustrates the composite nature of DRF, and links these with the sorts of 
practices within which they manifest, and examples of causal processes which may be 
relevant for each.  
 
 
======---------------- ---------------- 
 Insert table 1 about here  
   ======---------------- ---------------- 
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We will now discuss several overlapping suggestions from the literature 
concerning how to utilize DRF in research and clinical domains, and then outline the 
Risk-Causality Method.  
 
Incorporating DRF into Forensic Explanation 
There are a number of suggestions in the existing literature for how to best 
utilize DRF in the explanation of (re)offending and treatment planning. We will 
consider five of these here: (1) ignore the above problems and treat DRF as causes; (2) 
evaluate them against a set of risk factor causal criteria; (3) utilize a risk-matrix; (4) 
reconceptualize DRF as (proxies of) impairments in agency; and (5) locate DRF within 
social exemplars/practices. Our conclusion is that there is potential value in 
combining these models within a broader methodological framework (the RCM). The 
models and theoretical ideas we discuss in this section have appeared only relatively 
recently in academic journals and books. In part this is because the conceptual status 
of DRF has not previously been questioned and it was simply assumed that some of 
them (at least) were causal constructs.   
 
DRF as Causes 
The first strategy involves accepting DRF in their current form, and relying on 
these as promising candidates for the explanation of (re)offending – essentially 
business as usual. However, due to the difficulties outlined above we do not think that 
this is a viable theoretical strategy, and suggest that it will eventually lead the field of 
forensic and correctional psychology into a theoretical dead end (Ward & Beech, 
2015). Reflecting on Bonta and Andrews (2017) depiction of the causal relationships 
between seven of their “big eight” risk factors and crime Heffernan and Ward (2017) 
observe: 
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Rather than being an explanation of criminal behavior, the seven factors 
provide descriptions of problems typically observed in individuals who 
persistently offend and in their environments. At this point in time they are 
best viewed as broad areas indicating vulnerability rather than as specific 
causes of offending…..While this model describes the functional relationships 
between DRF and criminal conduct, in its current form it is unable to explain 
the onset and/or reoccurrence of crime…(p. 130). 
 
From DRF to Causal Status: Bradford Hill’s Criteria  
One strategy which rejects the assumption that DRF are causes in their typical 
composite form, asks researchers to evaluate the potential causal elements of DRF 
against standards such as Bradford-Hill’s (1965) criteria for causal inference in the 
medical epidemiology field. In essence, Bradford-Hill’s aim is to provide a set of 
criteria to elevate risk factors from the status of predictors to that of causes. He argues 
that it is reasonable to infer that a risk factor is a cause of a disease/problem if it is 
consistent with the following guidelines:  
1) Strong statistical association with a specific outcome 
2) Consistency (e.g., place, circumstances, time, and observers) 
3) Specificity (e.g., to particular groups, body systems and sites, and diseases) 
4) Temporality (a putative cause precedes an outcome) 
5) Biological gradient (e.g., expect a decrease in effect with a decrease in cause) 
6) Plausibility (i.e., is the cause reasonable within the context of current 
knowledge? Ideally an etiological/causal mechanism should be identified) 
7) Coherence (i.e., does it cohere with knowledge about the domain? Established 
facts act as epistemic constraints on causal inference) 
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8) Experimental manipulation (i.e., evidence from well-designed studies supports 
a cause and effect relationship) 
9) Analogy (i.e., the existence of other similar causal relationships) 
 
DRF in their current form arguably satisfy a number of these causal status 
criteria, however they fail to meet others. On the plus side of the equation: they are 
empirically derived from risk correlates (1); appear to hold across offending groups 
and raters (2); and have been observed to precede reoffending in longitudinal studies 
(4). However, on the negative side: they are not problems or outcomes which are 
specific to offending populations (3); they do not reliably exhibit the expected 
increases and decreases in conjunction with recidivism rates (5 & 8); they are not 
theoretically coherent and do not refer to causal mechanisms (6 & 7); and analogous 
concepts have not demonstrated causal relationships (9 - see for example the Research 
Domain Criteria project which aims to identify causal processes underlying 
psychopathology; Lilienfeld, 2014). The problem is that unlike the questions of 
causality posed by epidemiology (e.g., the relationship between the risk factor of 
smoking and lung cancer), risk factors do not refer to causes in any direct sense, and 
are inherently vague. By “inherently vague” we mean that in their current composite 
form they could refer to any number of possible situations and properties. Without 
further conceptual and theoretical analysis they simply contain too many causal 
possibilities to be confident of their role in facilitating norm-violations. In addition, 
many of the elements of causality contained within DRF categories have not yet been 
researched extensively with offending populations, and so it will be difficult to 
ascertain whether they meet the above criteria.  
The Bradford-Hill criteria outlined above offer useful suggestions for 
ascertaining whether or not specific factors summarized by DRF can be justifiably 
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considered by researchers and practitioners as possible causes or not. However, 
because these guidelines do not directly assist in the identification of the mechanisms 
underlying DRF, in the criminal justice area they are best utilized as initial filters to 
help identify possible causes of crime and its problems.  
Dynamic Risk Research Framework: Risk Matrix 
A third suggestion for the investigation of DRF was put forward by Ward and 
Fortune (2016b): The Dynamic Risk Research Framework (DRRF). This approach 
involves identifying the causal elements of DRF by referring to the psychological 
processes inferred in recent psychopathology research (i.e., it is heavily based on the 
Research Domain Criteria or RDoC project matrix; Lilienfeld, 2014). Briefly, the aim 
of the RDoC project is to develop new ways of classifying mental disorders based 
initially on five domains of psychological processes and their instantiation in 
neurobiology. The DRRF proposes that potential causal processes should be teased 
apart within a matrix spanning multiple levels of analysis. The Y axis contains six 
categories of possible causal processes: negative affective systems, positive affective 
systems, cognitive systems, self-regulation systems, intrapersonal social systems 
and interpersonal social systems (Ward & Fortune, 2016b, divided the RDoC domain 
of social processes into two separate categories). The X axis contains four different 
levels of analysis for each of the putative causal processes: biological, behavioral, 
phenomenological, and contextual (reduced from the RDoC’s six units of analysis). 
The purpose of multi-level data collection is to provide various types of evidence for 
causal processes, which can then be used to form more comprehensive explanations 
of risk-related phenomena (i.e., add explanatory depth). For example, emotional 
congruence with children contains a number of possible causal processes including a 
fear/anxiety response to adults, which can be investigated in terms of neural networks 
and physiological processes, thoughts, beliefs, and emotions, triggering contexts, and 
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resulting behaviors. A virtue of filtering DRF through the DRRF matrix with its core 
psychological domains and levels of analysis is that their various components and 
relationships with each other can be more easily discerned. This example will be 
analyzed in greater depth when we incorporate the DRRF into the Risk-Causality 
Method. 
The DRRF advocates for an understanding of normal or adaptive functioning, 
in order to better understand dysfunctional processes. The problem is that crime is not 
necessarily linked with dysfunction; mechanisms could be functioning as intended but 
directed towards maladaptive or harmful goals (i.e., the normative component). 
Nevertheless, it is likely that impairments will be present and relevant for a number of 
individuals, and that explanations pitched at the behavioral and relational (or possibly 
contextual) levels of analysis can capture the normative components of DRF, while the 
biological and phenomenological levels deal more directly with facts about the 
integrity of these systems. Therefore, we suggest that this approach has utility in 
guiding the theoretical exploration of DRF once they have been broken down into their 
causal, contextual, and symptom-like (behaviors and mental states) variables.  
Agency Impairments 
The fourth approach to the reconceptualization of DRF rests upon the concept 
of agency, the capacity for and process of goal-directed behavior. Recent theoretical 
papers attempting to link DRF with offending have highlighted the importance of 
agency and the associated view of offending as goal-directed behavior (Heffernan & 
Ward, 2015; Heffernan & Ward, 2017; Serin, Chadwick & Lloyd, 2016; Thornton, 
2016). Stressing the importance of focusing on actions as well as underlying 
mechanisms, Ward, Wilshire, and Jackson (2018, p. 199) comment “in the context of 
forensic psychology, our primary goal is to generate etiological explanations of 
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behavior. Since the targets of our explanations are complex behaviors, the 
psychological level of description has a privileged status here”.  
From this perspective, DRF are broad categories referring to (i.e., are proxies 
for) impairments in the capacities underlying agency (e.g., emotion, beliefs, desires, 
planning, counterfactual thinking, expectations, etc.) and/or social circumstances 
(e.g., gangs, poverty, unemployment) that cause behavior that is harmful and/or illegal 
in particular contexts. This means that DRF are contextually bound; what may be a 
strength or weakness for one individual or context may not be for another. While 
different theories infer diverse psychological structures and processes, the assertion is 
that DRF should be conceptualized as problems with the components of agency 
(intentional, goal directed behavior) and/or the contexts in which it is exercised. For 
example, intimacy deficits could be partially caused by fear responses to adults due to 
impaired theory of mind capacities (i.e., “women are cruel”), and poor problem-
solving skills could be due to impairments in generating multiple options for action or 
difficulties with counterfactual thinking. 
Conceptualizing DRF as problems with the capacities underpinning agency can 
begin to overcome the issue of their composite nature, as aspects of various DRF are 
dispersed throughout the agency process. To take the example of emotional 
congruence with children: an individual values and is motivated to achieve intimacy 
(i.e., relatedness and pleasure) but believes that adults will harm him; he is in a 
situation where he feels threatened and lacks the necessary skills to regulate these 
feelings and he is in an environment with vulnerable children; these impairments and 
situational factors interact to cause an offence. The focus on human agency means that 
the first-person, intentional level of explanation is prioritized. Because explanations 
tend to focus primarily on behavior and the psychological and situational explanatory 
levels they do not necessarily incorporate social, cultural, or biological aspects well 
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and thus need to be supplemented with explanations spanning these additional levels 
of analysis. They are descriptions of action sequences and as such useful for (1) 
identifying salient patterns to analyze further, and (2) informing the critical 
explanatory targetsof theories of crime. 
Exemplars and Social Practices 
The final way of analyzing DRF to be discussed here is that of exemplars and 
normative social practices. The basic idea is to embed the description of DRF within 
their relevant temporal and social contexts. The difference between agency models and 
the exemplar/practices approach is that the former is focused on what persons do 
while the latter is on problems and their manifestation. 
Firstly, “an exemplar is a representation of the typical course and symptoms of 
a mental illness, whereas a model is a representation of those symptoms, that course, 
and the causal determinants of both of them. A model is an exemplar together with an 
explanation” (Murphy, 2006, p. 206). In the forensic/correctional context, exemplars 
could be prototypical offence action sequences, such as carefully planned “grooming” 
behaviors and the sexual abuse of children. Practices are coordinated sets of actions 
centered upon certain goals and their associated norms (Ward & Heffernan, 2017). 
Norms are evaluative in nature and spell out whether or not an activity is done 
properly; whether it meets the socially accepted relevant standards. Practices typically 
depict normative behavior, and DRF represent violations of these norms. For example, 
in the case of normative sexual behavior: partners should be cognitively competent 
adults, sex should occur in private settings, and ought to only involve sexual behaviors 
that are agreed to and are relatively harmless. In the case of intimate romantic 
relationships: they should only occur between consenting adults, ought to be 
reciprocal, should include personal disclosure of fears and needs, ought to incorporate 
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caregiving and sexual components, should contain shared activities and 
responsibilities, and so on. 
The practices and exemplars approach provides a useful way to identify the 
relevant norms and social/cultural models which govern human behavior, including 
norm-violating patterns of behavior (i.e., illegal practices), which rely upon the 
functioning of agency capacities. It respects the first person perspective in providing 
unique insight into intentional practices, but also makes room for a third person (i.e., 
an observer) perspective in the form of norms and social expectations. Thus it deals 
with both the normative aspects of DRF, as well as assuming that the external 
conditions for agency are present. However, this approach to reworking DRF lacks 
depth concerning the structures and processes underpinning agency. The intentional 
level of explanation cannot tap into the range of sub personal mechanisms which 
underlie goal-directed practices. Like the agency approach above, this needs to be 
supplemented with a more in-depth exploration of causal processes across additional 
levels of explanation.  
 
The Risk-Causality Method 
Each of the above potential ways of reworking DRF to causally explain norm-
violations and to guide treatment has its own list of strengths and weaknesses. While 
they propose that the deconstruction and investigation of possible causal elements 
should play an important role in directing research into the causes of norm-violations, 
they fail to provide sufficient guidance to researchers and practitioners. Capitalizing 
on the strengths of the above models we have developed the Risk-Causality Method 
(RCM) conceptual framework, which structures the analysis of DRF into three phases: 
deconstruction, analysis, and reintegration. In the RCM, each of the above 
suggestions for transforming DRF into possible causal elements plays a valuable role, 
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albeit in different phases of the model. The specific theories and models used in this 
section should be viewed only as examples to illustrate the utility of the RCM and 
ought not to be regarded as the correct way to unpack each phase. What is unique is 
the RCM methodological framework, not the specific models and ideas associated with 
each of its three phases. Future use of the model needs to draw from a greater variety 
of theories supported by multi-disciplinary research. We will now outline the three 
phases of the RCM in general terms before applying it to an example of a DRF.  
RCM Phase One: Deconstruction 
The first phase of the RCM logically follows previous research which regards 
DRF as useful markers of (or as red flags for) crime related factors. Their role in the 
inquiry process is to direct attention to potential causes, relevant contextual features, 
and salient behavioral and mental state variables (“symptoms”). It is important 
during this first step of deconstructing DRF to view them within the context of goal-
directed practices, and to consider whether they could potentially meet Bradford-Hill's 
(1965) causal criteria. This will ensure that both the factual and normative aspects of 
DRF are considered. For example, Mann et al.’s (2010) list of empirically support DRF 
for sexual offending are a useful starting point. While they do not meet all of Bradford-
Hill's (1965) criteria, they are currently the closest thing we have to psychologically 
meaningful constructs (i.e., agency capacities) which are linked with this particular 
type of norm-violation (Mann et al., 2010).  
Once a candidate DRF is identified, researchers and practitioners should 
generate an exemplar (i.e., a typical description) of problems within this category; 
these anchor the first phase. Researchers can then describe the behavioral or mental 
state (i.e., self-report) symptom-like aspects of the DRF, the contexts in which these 
are observed, and the range of potential causal processes underpinning these. The 
identification of the different types of constructs contained within each DRF makes it 
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easier to think about the causes of crime and the way they interact with contextual 
variables and each other.  
In order to provide structure to the identification of these causal processes, 
researchers should consider the six types of causal processes listed in the DRRF in the 
section above: negative affective systems, positive affective systems, cognitive systems, 
interpersonal social systems, self-regulatory systems, and intrapersonal social 
systems. Carefully filtering the types of causal processes referred to by DRF will help 
researchers constrain their subsequent analyses of the relevant mechanisms.  
RCM Phase two: Analysis 
The second phase of the RCM begins with the list of promising causal 
candidates from phase one. In the analysis phase researchers should refer each of the 
possible causes to something like the DRRF matrix to discern their possible specific 
causal components and the evidence for them at different levels of analysis. This 
process draws from psychological, social, and neuroscientific theories to infer possible 
mechanisms (causes) and processes. While this is potentially the most complex phase, 
it is a very important one, and requires thorough investigation in order to provide 
comprehensive multi-level accounts of the phenomena in question (i.e., those 
identified in phase one).  
The result of the second phase will be models of each potential causal process 
(repeated for all of the DRF). These models should spell out how a system ought to 
function, and thus be able to identify whether or not it is operating as it should. In 
addition, these models will require reintegration with a more general conception of 
human agency (see the next phase) in order to understand their interaction and 
influences on behavior – no system on its own can explain how these processes 
contribute to serious norm violations.  
RCM Phase Three: Reintegration 
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In the third phase of the RCM the goal is to knit the information provided in the 
earlier two phases together. The various models and relevant contextual features, 
mental state and behavioral variables are integrated within a model of goal-directed 
practices, such as the Predictive Agency Model (PAM; Heffernan & Ward, 2017). This 
step illustrates the role of the causal processes in problematic engagement in 
normative practices, such as intimacy, sex, coping, and so on. In this sense the final 
step is reintegrating information concerning the various problems or impairments 
(the causal processes) underpinning norm violations, with the sorts of practices and 
environments in which they manifest. The depiction of the RCM so far has been very 
abstract, so we provide a visual model below, and in the following section we apply the 
RCM to a concrete example.  
 
======---------------- ---------------- 
 Insert figure 1 about here  
   ======---------------- ---------------- 
 
Illustrating the Risk-Causality Method: Emotional Congruence 
In this section we outline the application of the three phases outlined above to 
the ongoing example of emotional congruence with children. This will illustrate the 
use of the RCM in guiding theoretical research into the mechanisms underlying DRF. 
We make a distinction between the theoretical task of developing general explanations 
of DRF and the more specific task of individual case formulation. This paper is 
primarily focused on the first task but has implications for the second. Once the initial 
theoretical work has been completed in line with the RCM, simplified versions of the 
models constructed can be utilized in practice with individual cases if and when they 
are deemed relevant.  
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RCM Phase One: Deconstruction 
Our example DRF, emotional congruence with children is one of Mann et al.'s 
(2010) psychologically meaningful risk factors; thus it is reliably linked with sexual 
reoffending and is a plausible causal factor. It involves an individual experiencing 
intimate relationships with children as more emotionally satisfying than relationships 
with peers. This individual could find children easier to relate to and/or still feel like a 
child himself, and believe that children understand and accept him more than other 
adults. This often results in feeling like he is “in love” with his young victims, and to 
think of the relationship as reciprocal and mutually beneficial (Mann et al., 2010). An 
exemplar may read: He is unable to engage in the normal social practices of adult 
romantic relationship establishment, maintenance, and repair. This is because he 
values sex and intimacy with children positively and devalues or fears that with 
adults. He feels safe and valued around children, and believes that his victim was a 
willing participant in the relationship. 
From here it is possible to deconstruct emotional congruence with children into 
different types of causal processes and contexts/situations that interact to generate the 
symptoms (i.e., behaviors and mental states) evident in individuals who feel 
emotionally drawn to children: 
• Mental state/behavioral variables (i.e., symptoms): For example, 
feelings of fear, loneliness, desire, safety, excitement, hopefulness, 
despair, avoids intimacy with adults, makes statements reflecting beliefs 
about children as capable of consenting to and enjoying sex (i.e., willing 
participant), reports being in love with victims, uses “grooming” 
strategies to establish trust. 
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• Contexts/situations: For example, has friendships and intimate contact 
with children, social isolation, lack of intimacy with adults, regular 
unsupervised access to children, deviant social networks. 
• Possible causal processes: 
o Negative affective systems: For example, fear and anxiety (i.e., 
fearful/avoidant attachment); loneliness; guilt/shame (i.e., post-hoc 
rationalizations). 
o Positive affective systems: For example, views children as sources of 
reward and more likely to signal opportunities for love, sexual pleasure, 
and care. 
o Cognitive systems: For example, displays attentional bias towards signs 
of affection from children or indicators that it might be possible to 
become involved with them sexually and emotionally (e.g., cues 
signifying vulnerability, lack of supervision); beliefs/schema support 
associations between children and sex (i.e., it is not harmful), 
developmental deficits (i.e., cognitive impairments).  
o Intrapersonal social systems: For example, a tendency to view himself 
as vulnerable and unsafe, living in a dangerous world; lacks 
understanding of his motives due to expectancy and interpretational 
biases. 
o Self-regulation systems: For example, lacks the capacity to soothe 
himself and effectively control negative physiological arousal; seeks 
interaction with children to do this and constructs elaborate grooming 
strategies to accomplish this based on problematic beliefs and goals. 
o Interpersonal social systems: For example, theory of mind impairments 
(i.e., inability to take the perspective of and represent others’ mental 
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states), internal working models in which affiliation seeking strategies 
are entirely directed towards daily interactions with children, including 
sexual contact. These may be strengthened via involvement in deviant 
social networks that approve of sex and intimacy with children. 
 
Thus, in this first phase we view DRF as instigators of inquiry (markers of 
causal processes), rather than as endpoints of inquiry.  The causal processes identified 
during phase one are the targets for analysis in phase two, and are then reintegrated 
within a model of human agency in phase three.  
RCM Phase Two: Analysis 
The second phase involves an in-depth analysis of the potential causal 
processes identified, and use of the DRRF (Ward & Fortune, 2016b) in order to 
investigate each of these systems across multiple levels of analysis: biological, 
behavioral, phenomenological, and contextual. Due to limited space, we will focus on 
the example of a negative affective system identified in phase one above: the tendency 
to view adults as threats and a source of fear and anxiety, resulting in avoidance of 
intimacy with adults and a preference for intimacy with children. At the biological 
level, this system could involve the amygdala, central nervous system, and associated 
physical responses to fear and anxiety (e.g., heart racing, dry mouth, and 
perspiration). At the behavioral level this system is primarily concerned with fight or 
flight responses, for example avoidance of interactions with adults or hostility and 
mistrust towards them. These behaviors could manifest in a lifestyle (i.e., social and 
physical contexts) characterized by “social isolation” or “intimacy deficits”, and the 
seeking out children as a safer alternative. The contexts in which these systems are 
activated may include social events where unknown adults are present, rejection from 
adults, and where norms require social interaction. At the phenomenological level this 
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system involves beliefs about adults (e.g., rejecting, dangerous, manipulating), 
memory and attentional biases (i.e., towards events that confirm these beliefs), and 
associated emotions such as fear, anxiety, and loneliness.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of how things have gone wrong, 
researchers need to explain how a threat detection system ought to work. Its 
functioning likely exists upon a continuum, with a healthy range existing within the 
middle, and sub-optimum functioning when the system is over or under-functioning. 
It is also context-dependent and normatively defined, for example it is normal and 
adaptive to be more sensitive to interpersonal threat in prison, whereas intimacy 
practices require a certain level of trust and vulnerability. For this reason, the 
contextual level must be explored and integrated with lower levels of analysis. The 
analysis phase involves integrating evidence from a number of disciplines, for example 
psychopathology (e.g., social phobia), evolutionary psychology (e.g., the selective 
advantage of fear responses), developmental psychology (e.g., attachment), and 
neuropsychology and biology will be particularly useful for lower level explanations. 
This work remains to be done, and is outside the scope of this paper. It is anticipated 
that the output from phase two will consist of a number of specific models centered 
upon each identified causal process, and spanning multiple levels of analysis.  
It is also worth noting at this point that the functioning of the negative affective 
system (and others) is relevant to a wider range of symptoms and behaviors which 
reflect the violation of accepted social norms, not just emotional congruence with 
children and sexual offending. For example, dysfunctional threat detection may play a 
role in social anxiety, general relationship problems, violent offending, and substance 
abuse. The same underlying mechanisms can produce different behaviors (both legal 
and illegal) depending upon the context and the functioning of other systems. It may 
lead to sexual offending against children when paired with a sexual preference for 
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children, beliefs about the ability of children to consent to sexual intimacy, or self-
regulation problems (i.e., intoxication lowering inhibitions) in certain contexts.  
RCM Phase Three: Reintegration 
 The third phase involves the reintegration of causal processes and their 
associated systems (i.e., local theories) within an agency framework containing 
emotional capacities; psychological representations; cognitive processes; formulating 
goals and plans; implementing plans; evaluating outcomes; and modifying plans and 
goals within day to day activities (i.e., goal-directed practices). The goal of this phase 
is to provide an understanding of how the putative causal processes contained within 
each DRF interact with each other and contextual features to produce offending 
behavior. For illustrative purposes, we will embed our example within the previously 
developed Predictive Agency Model (PAM, Heffernan & Ward, 2017).  
In our (speculative) example, underlying fear/anxiety towards adults is an 
internal working model of the self as vulnerable, other adults as dangerous and 
children as safe and accepting. In terms of general affect, the individual is lonely due 
to avoidance of peers, and is overly sensitive to interpersonal threat. In social 
situations, such as family gatherings, he tends to pay attention to social cues which 
support his internal working models, and construct situation-specific models which 
are in line with these. For example, if certain adults do not talk to him it is perceived 
that they dislike and want to harm him. He has developed the ability to quickly create 
friendships with children, and is good at putting children at ease and getting parents 
to trust him (i.e., he can anticipate their reactions to his interest in children). He has 
excellent planning abilities and is always thinking several moves ahead; he rarely acts 
impulsively. 
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======---------------- ---------------- 
 Insert figure 2 about here  
======---------------- ---------------- 
 
 
Summary 
We have taken just one example of a DRF and used the Risk-Causality Method 
to tease out possible causes, contexts, and behavioral and mental state variables 
(“symptoms”) in order to explain how they might manifest in harmful social behavior. 
It is clear from this example that emotional congruence with children is linked to other 
DRF, such as problematic beliefs and deviant sexual preferences. An advantage of 
breaking down DRF and embedding them in behavior in this way is that it becomes 
easier to formulate cases. Once further theoretical work has been completed, 
practitioners will have access to a causal model not simply a statistical/predictive one. 
This offers greater potential for accounting for diverse behavioral features with an 
integrated set of mechanisms, is more individualized, and has greater explanatory 
depth - it provides more information than stating that “this individual emotionally 
identifies with children”. In addition, because of its focus on mechanisms and their 
ability to function within certain contexts, the RCM has the potential to explain the 
role of protective factors in desistence, another area that has been theoretically 
neglected.  
 
Implications for Practice 
Case formulation is the analogue of theory construction in the practice domain: 
the creation of an explanatory model that accounts for the onset, interrelationships, 
and maintenance of problems associated with crime (Hart & Logan, 2011; Sturmey & 
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McMurran, 2011; Ward & Beech, 2015). Forensic and correctional case formulation is 
used to guide the rehabilitation of those who have committed offences, and until 
recently has received relatively little attention in the literature (Sturmey & McMurran, 
2011). It is an important task, which involves the gathering of risk-related data and 
construction of a plausible explanation (i.e., a hypothesis) for how and why these 
factors cause and maintain offending. Typically, it is based upon the widely accepted 
“propensity model” of risk, where a number of long term vulnerabilities, known as 
Dynamic Risk Factors (DRF), interact with environmental triggers and opportunities 
to influence behavior (Beech & Ward, 2004). Case formulation bridges the gap 
between prediction and explanation. It guides practice via the integration of empirical 
knowledge and theoretical understanding of DRF. The problem facing forensic and 
correctional practitioners at the moment is that existing case formulation models 
assume that DRF are theoretically coherent constructs, when in our view, they are not 
(see Sturmey & McMurran, 2011). 
Our primary goal in this paper has been to consider the relevance and value of 
the RCM for researchers rather than practitioners. This is primarily because it makes 
little sense to construct case formulation and intervention plans without a reasonable 
understanding of what the causes of crime related phenomena are. Simply relying on 
DRF as treatment targets is a mistake as they do not reliably identify underlying causes 
at all; they are in effect summary labels for possible causes, contextual features, 
behavior, and mental state variables. Strictly speaking, DRF do not exist for the 
purposes of treatment, there is little point targeting symptom-like summaries and 
assuming that this will alter the causal mechanisms generating them. However, from 
a pragmatic viewpoint the RCM can play a valuable role in structuring clinical inquiry 
and, in conjunction with knowledge of etiological theories, risk assessment, and 
classification models, can assist practitioners to arrive at a working explanation of an 
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individual’s crime related problems. It can bridge the gap between risk assessment and 
intervention, and ensure that practitioners carefully consider the explanatory 
possibilities offered by DRF and avoid the trap of assuming they directly pick out 
causal factors.  An advantage of structuring assessment and subsequent treatment by 
the RCM is that it confers a degree of epistemic skepticism on practitioners’ 
conceptualizations of clients and reminds them that they critically depend on 
theoretical and methodological assumptions.  
 
Conclusions 
We have argued that DRF should not be accepted at face value as possible 
causes of offending because of the problems of incoherence, lack of specificity, the 
grain problem, and their marked normative status. We introduced the RCM with its 
phases of deconstruction, analysis, and reintegration as a promising way forward in 
the investigation of the potential causal elements contained within the broad DRF 
categories. We propose that the RCM can be usefully applied to DRF to “boot strap” 
theory development and eventually provide a valuable source of information for 
formulating cases, when paired with a case-formulation model such as the Abductive 
Theory of Method (ATOM; Haig, 2012; Ward, Clack & Haig, 2016). At this stage it is 
intended primarily as a research model which aims to provide a link between theory 
and practice.  
We have concentrated in this paper on the role of DRF in explaining offending 
and its associated problems. The reason for this is that there is strong theoretical 
justification and relevant evidence that these risk predictors may also be causes of 
(re)offending. However, the RCM can also be utilized with other types of potential 
causal factors such as those in etiological theories or implicit within classification 
systems. For example, attachment models of intimacy deficits in sexual offenders 
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propose that problematic social behavior is in part caused by impaired internal 
working models of relationships (Smallbone & Dadds, 2000). Maladaptive core beliefs 
of the self and other people are aligned with interpersonal strategies designed to 
protect individuals from rejection and overwhelming negative emotional states. 
Alternatively, according to the self-regulation model of the offence process, individuals 
who commit sexual offences vary in terms of their core values, goals, and strategies for 
managing problematic desires and situations. These differences manifest in distinct 
patterns of offending behavior (Yates & Kingston, 2006). In both of these examples, 
the RCM could be applied to possible casual mechanisms such as impaired internal 
working models or self-regulation styles to develop richer theoretical depictions of 
them.  In addition, it would help researchers to trace their links to various mental 
states, behaviors, and contextual features, and to spell out any possible treatment 
implications. Thus, the RCM has the potential to unify theory development tasks in a 
variety of research domains, and has a much wider reach that simply breaking down 
DRF. 
Finally, even at this preliminary point of the RCM’s development, practitioners 
may find it useful to guide the assessment and treatment of individuals who have 
committed offences. Simply relying on existing case formulation models or etiological 
theories that assume that DRF (as currently stated in the literature) are possible causes 
is likely to result in overly general, poorly integrated formulations (i.e., everyone looks 
the same or possible hypotheses are overlooked). Our suggestion is that in the domain 
of intervention DRF should only be used to indicate general problem areas and 
regarded as summaries of possible causes, contextual factors, behavioral, and mental 
state variables. By the processes of deconstruction, analysis, and reintegration we can 
put DRF to work in ways that are likely to give us a deeper understanding of why and 
how individuals act in ways that harm other people. The RCM enables researchers and 
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practitioners to bridge the gap between theory and intervention in the criminal justice 
system. In order to intervene to effectively reduce crime it is necessary to move beyond 
risk assessment and management. Ultimately this requires us to appreciate how risk 
factors exert causal effects and how best to ameliorate their influence.  
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Table 1. Supported and Promising* Psychologically Meaningful Risk Factors (Mann et 
al., 2010) 
	
 
Domain DRF Types of practices E.g.,  causal processes 
Sexual  Sexual preoccupation 
Any deviant sexual interest:  
e.g., children, violence, multiple 
paraphilia 
Sexual acts, seeking sex, 
frequency, number/characteristics 
of preferred partners 
Sexual drive, arousal, attraction 
(preference), acceptance of sexual 
identity, sexual scripts/schema 
Intimacy Emotional congruence with 
children 
Lack of emotionally intimate 
relationships with adults: e.g., 
never married, conflicts in 
intimate relationships 
Callousness/lack of concern for 
others* 
Partner choice, communication, 
establishing and maintaining 
bonds, vulnerable disclosure, 
caring for others, negotiating 
conflict, commitment 
Interpersonal skills, preferences 
for emotional intimacy, capacity 
for sexual and emotional 
connection, attachment processes, 
language and communication 
 
Self-
regulation 
Lifestyle impulsivity 
General self-regulation 
problems: e.g., impulsivity, 
recklessness, employment 
instability 
Poor cognitive problem-solving 
Resistance to rules/supervision: 
e.g., childhood behavioral 
problems, non-compliance with 
supervision, violation of 
conditional release 
Dysfunctional coping: e.g., 
sexualized, externalizing* 
Seeking employment, managing 
finances, leisure activities, self-
care, compliance with rules/law, 
problem solving, planning and 
goal setting, communication of 
emotions, coping 
Motivation, self-control, skills 
relevant to context (e.g., attitudes, 
conflict resolution), emotion: 
recognition, interpretation, control 
Attitudes Offense-supportive attitudes 
Hostility toward women* 
Machiavellianism* 
Representing reality, causal 
reasoning, 
interpretation/attribution, 
explaining and justifying action 
Memory, causal reasoning, theory 
of mind, cognitive flexibility, 
interpreting input,  
accuracy (i.e., based on evidence) 
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